

Towards a formal x86 ISA specification

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About me

@ Arm Research: 15 years

- Creating formal Arm ISA specification
- Formal verification of CPUs
- @ Google Research: 2 years
 - Software verification (Rust)
- @ Intel Labs: 9 months
 - Creating formal x86 ISA specification

Most projects I work on take 3-5 years to produce results

Our industry needs better ISA specs

For humans

- Clear, trustworthy, authoritative human readable specifications

For tools

- To verify hardware https://alastairreid.github.io/papers/CAV_16/
- To verify (critical) software
- To check that (critical) software is secure?
- To verify compiler backends
- To build binary analysis tools (e.g., malware analysis)

Existing formal ISA specifications

Arm formal ISA spec

- Arm's official specification
- Can boot Linux
- Publicly available in machine readable form
- Passes Arm's architectural conformance test suite
- Used to formally verify parts of Arm processors
- Used in Arm's documentation

RISC-V formal ISA spec

- RISC-V's official formal spec
- Can boot Linux
- Publicly available in machine readable form
- Thoroughly tested

Arm specification (ASL language)

```
31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20
                                    16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9
                                                              5 4
                                                                           0
 sf 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
                                       0 0 0 0 0 0
                               Rm
                                                         Rn
                                                                     Rd
   op S
integer d = UInt(Rd);
integer n = UInt(Rn);
integer m = UInt(Rm);
integer datasize = if sf == '1' then 64 else 32;
bits(datasize) result;
bits(datasize) operand1 = X[n];
bits(datasize) operand2 = X[m];
(result, -) = AddWithCarry(operand1, operand2, PSTATE.C);
X[d] = result;
```

RISC-V specification (SAIL language)

mapping clause encdec = RTYPE(rs2, rs1, rd, RISCV_ADD) <-> 0b0000000 @ rs2 @ rs1 @ 0b0000 @ rd @ 0b0110011

```
function clause execute (RTYPE(rs2, rs1, rd, op)) = {
  let rs1_val = X(rs1);
  let rs2_val = X(rs2);
  let result : xlenbits = match op {
    RISCV_ADD => rs1_val + rs2_val,
    RISCV_SLT => EXTZ(bool_to_bits(rs1_val <_s rs2_val)),
    ...
};
X(rd) = result;
RETIRE SUCCESS</pre>
```

IA specification (WIP)


Current

Operation

DEST := DEST + SRC + CF;

Flags Affected

The OF, SF, ZF, AF, CF, and PF flags are set according to the result.



Creating a formal ISA spec

- What makes it easy?
- What makes it hard?
- Where is the research?
- Helping you use the specification

How to write an ISA spec

Choose a language


- Goal: industry standard for ISA specification
- Arm's Architecture Specification Language


Write a specification

- Based on existing documentation, simulators, etc.

Write lots of tools

- Generate documentation from spec
- Support development, migration, checking, ...





What makes it easy?

Done it before: experience + examples

Lots of testing collateral inside company

Recognized need and benefits

- Multiple internal attempts
- Successful external attempts (other architectures)

Motivating a company

https://alastairreid.github.io/mrs-at-scale/

- Formally verify hardware
- Validate simulators, firmware, microcode, ...
- Support development of new architecture extensions
- Move faster
- Improve coherence across the company

What makes it hard?

Lots of testing collateral inside company

- Need for extremely high quality
- Need efficient bug triage tools

Must not accidentally change the architecture

- But need to fix gaps, bugs, accidental ambiguities

Underspecification

- Instructions allow a range of behaviors

Where are the research challenges? Part 1

Security

- Can we detect security issues in new architecture extensions?
- Can we say anything useful about side channels?
 - e.g., Formally specify things that can be observed and what can / cannot influence them?
- Can we say anything useful about speculation, etc.?
- Can we verify security of hardware against the spec?

Many, many security-related questions

- Q: Is my software secure?
- Q: Is my architecture secure? (See https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2022/07/22/formal-cheri/)
- Q: What security properties does my architecture satisfy?
- Q: Can we verify security of hardware wrt the spec?
- Q: Are those properties useful to software developers?
- Q: Does change X to the architecture break existing security properties?
- Q: What to do about side channels?
- Q: What to say about transient execution?
- Q: What about the rest of the chip?

Where are the research challenges? Part 2

Enabling novel tools

https://alastairreid.github.io/uses-for-isa-specs/

- Compilers: verify peephole optimizations?
- Synthesis: generate peephole optimizations?
- Analysis: malware analysis of binaries
- Security: detect security vulnerabilities in binaries

How best to develop new uses?

- Open source our specification
- Open source our tools?
- Collaborate with academia, etc.?
- Blog posts?
- Example code?
- Tutorials?

Please talk to me about how I can help your research



Starting to build an official formal spec of the Intel Architecture Industry standard around how we write ISA specs? Still early days (which makes this a great time to start talking to us about your needs!) Please talk to me about how I can help your research

(Obvious omissions from this talk: formally verifying x86 processors; weak memory model)

